Montenegro to Implement Stricter Fiscal Regulations by 2027

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Montenegro is set to establish a more rigorous framework for managing public debt, state guarantees, and capital expenditures starting from January 1, 2027. This shift in fiscal policy will transition from an annual budget approach to a comprehensive four-year strategy, which will be overseen by an enhanced Fiscal Council.

The forthcoming Law on the Budget and Fiscal Responsibility stipulates that if the public-debt ratio exceeds 60 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), the government will be mandated to develop a fiscal-convergence plan. This plan must outline annual targets, strategies for debt reduction, and a timeline for returning public finances to compliance.

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While maintaining Maastricht-style limits of 3 percent of GDP for the general government deficit and 60 percent for public debt, the new regulations aim to impose stricter consequences for breaches. Previous fiscal guidelines served primarily as benchmarks without necessitating transparent corrective measures when borrowing exceeded these thresholds.

This reform comes at a critical juncture as Montenegro embarks on a new phase of infrastructure investment. The government plans to fund projects related to roads, energy infrastructure, municipal services, and EU-related investments. As of March 2026, the country’s debt stood at €5.13 billion, or 59.9 percent of GDP, leaving limited flexibility for economic downturns or additional borrowing before triggering corrective actions.

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If the debt surpasses the 60 percent threshold, the government’s Fiscal Strategy will have to include a detailed plan for reducing the debt ratio. Should public debt exceed this limit at the inception of the new legislation, a convergence program must be integrated into the next Fiscal Strategy to prevent further increases in the debt ratio until compliance is achieved.

This regulatory framework intends to replace vague commitments with specific annual obligations, enhancing accountability. Its effectiveness will hinge on the inclusion of binding decisions regarding expenditure and revenue rather than solely relying on projected economic growth to manage the debt-to-GDP ratio.

Montenegro’s nominal GDP could increase through real growth and inflation, thereby mechanically lowering the debt ratio even if absolute debt levels remain high. Consequently, investors and credit rating agencies are likely to focus on key indicators such as primary budget balance, interest expenditures, refinancing needs, and the proportion of new debt allocated for productive investments.

The proposed rules allow for temporary deviations during significant economic disruptions or emergencies such as natural disasters or national security threats. These exemptions would typically last no longer than one fiscal year but could be extended under certain circumstances. Increased defense spending aligned with international obligations would also be treated separately within the Fiscal Strategy.

The Fiscal Strategy will cover a duration of four years, projecting revenue, expenditures, budget balance, and public debt while outlining net expenditure growth paths. This structured approach aims to establish medium-term spending ceilings for various ministries and budget entities, complicating the introduction of permanent measures without demonstrating their long-term impact.

If not established in time, expenditure limits would be restricted to align with projected nominal GDP growth rates unless an economic contraction is anticipated. Net expenditure calculations will exclude interest payments and EU-funded spending to maintain fiscal flexibility while ensuring participation in EU programs remains viable.

The proposed legislation significantly enhances the authority of Montenegro’s Fiscal Council, which will evaluate government economic forecasts, budgets, and overall fiscal strategies. Its oversight will extend beyond recorded public debt to encompass risks associated with demographic changes, pensions, healthcare obligations, public-private partnerships, and liabilities from state-controlled entities.

Outstanding state guarantees will be limited to 15 percent of GDP, applicable only for financing capital projects. Recipients of guarantees must pay a risk charge equivalent to 1 percent of the guarantee or loan value, due within 30 days post-agreement signing. This fee aims to mitigate risks borne by taxpayers and discourage municipalities from perceiving sovereign guarantees as free financial support.

Municipal borrowing will also come under stricter central oversight; local assemblies cannot adopt budgets without positive feedback from the Ministry of Finance. If no response is received within 15 working days, it will be assumed that approval has been granted. This measure seeks to reinforce central control over municipal fiscal risks that could necessitate national intervention.

The Ministry of Finance plans to establish an electronic register detailing public investments across all levels of government and state-controlled enterprises. This register must be updated at least every three months and will require formal project appraisals before entering capital budgets.

Additionally, enforcement mechanisms against unauthorized budgetary spending are strengthened under this draft law. The Ministry of Finance may restrict funding or impose penalties on officials responsible for financial mismanagement. Proposed fines range from €600 to €6,000 for serious violations.

The legislation aims to enhance transparency regarding fiscal risks associated with state guarantees and tax concessions by requiring detailed disclosures in future budget proposals. A simplified “citizens’ budget” must also be made available within 15 working days after submitting budget proposals to parliament.

The phased implementation schedule allows institutions time to refine their data systems; however, it also postpones critical reforms that could affect Montenegro’s fiscal landscape almost immediately given its current proximity to the 60 percent GDP threshold. The effectiveness of these new regulations will largely depend on their execution and adherence in addressing Montenegro’s fiscal challenges moving forward.

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