Brussels Targets Reforms in Montenegro’s State Capitalism

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Montenegro is facing significant changes as the European Union (EU) pushes for a reformation of its state capitalism model. The EU’s new competition, state aid, and governance regulations are set to challenge longstanding practices regarding bailouts, board appointments, and preferential contracts within the country.

The state’s multifaceted role in the corporate sector—as a shareholder, regulator, lender, customer, and rescuer—is being scrutinized under the framework of EU accession. The competition policy negotiation chapter was provisionally concluded in July 2026, following Montenegro’s adoption of a comprehensive antitrust and merger-control framework. This includes the establishment of the Agency for Protection of Competition, which has the authority to impose interim measures, accept commitments from companies, and enforce penalties. Additionally, a new law allows companies and consumers to seek damages for competition violations. A revised state-aid law introduced in 2025 enhances oversight regarding support provided to businesses and mandates the recovery of any unlawful aid.

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These regulatory changes are crucial for private investors as they will influence the competitive landscape. They will determine whether a well-performing company can effectively compete against politically connected rivals, whether acquisitions are subject to thorough evaluations, and if state-owned enterprises can continue to operate under favorable conditions due to taxpayer backing.

The EU’s examination of support provided to Montenegro Airlines highlights the complexities involved when public companies face financial difficulties. The potential economic continuity between the defunct carrier and its successor, Air Montenegro, raises questions about state aid liabilities. A change in company name does not automatically eliminate past obligations related to state support.

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This principle extends beyond aviation and affects how the government can manage insolvent state enterprises. It necessitates careful scrutiny of market conditions before recapitalizing or transferring assets. Consequently, lenders and commercial partners must consider that contracts with newly established public entities may still carry historical liabilities from their predecessors.

The entry of Wizz Air into Podgorica intensifies this scrutiny as it operates under commercial principles while Air Montenegro is bound by public connectivity obligations and compliance with EU regulations. Airports of Montenegro serves as both an infrastructure provider and a commercial partner in this evolving landscape.

In June 2026, Montenegro’s parliament enacted legislation aimed at reforming governance within state-owned companies. This law establishes a standardized ownership framework overseen by the finance ministry, introducing competitive selection processes for board members alongside measurable performance objectives. The legislation draws upon OECD principles to enhance coherence across various state-owned entities.

The effectiveness of these reforms will be tested across key public companies such as EPCG, Airports of Montenegro, Port of Bar, and Air Montenegro. While transparent recruitment processes may be implemented, persistent informal political influences could undermine their efficacy. The real challenge lies in whether boards can resist unprofitable directives, disclose conflicts of interest, and replace underperforming management.

For minority investors and lenders, credible governance practices could mitigate risk exposure; however, for political entities, these reforms pose a threat to existing patronage networks. The shift from relationships to evidence-based performance metrics represents a significant power redistribution within the public sector.

Public procurement accounted for 11.38% of Montenegro’s GDP in 2024. The introduction of e-procurement systems aims to align more closely with EU practices and broaden opportunities for contractors across various sectors. Enhanced transparency in evaluations could also facilitate financing for bidders by allowing them to better assess process risks.

However, a potential loophole identified by the European Commission involves a 2025 tourism agreement with the United Arab Emirates that exempts certain related contracts from procurement laws. This raises concerns about preferential treatment for specific investments while potentially undermining broader reform efforts.

A dual-track market could jeopardize the integrity of procurement reforms if favored projects bypass standard compliance protocols while ordinary bidders are held to stricter standards. This situation may discourage serious international contractors from participating in Montenegrin projects due to perceived uncertainties.

The recent regulatory changes pose challenges for companies reliant on bailouts or opaque contracts while favoring efficient private entrants and public companies that can demonstrate commercial viability. However, effective implementation of these laws is critical for achieving desired outcomes.

The competition agency requires adequate resources and confidence to investigate influential business groups thoroughly. Courts need to handle fines and claims consistently, while ministries must adhere strictly to notification requirements regarding aid disbursements. Furthermore, procurement systems should incorporate mechanisms to identify collusion rather than merely digitizing existing processes.

As Montenegro has provisionally closed its competition chapter with the EU, its corporate sector is only beginning to navigate these new realities. The true measure of accession credibility will depend on the government’s willingness to uphold its new rules even when faced with conflicting interests.

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